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Abstract
Knock Codes are a knowledge-based unlock authentication
scheme used on LG smartphones where a user enters a code
by tapping or “knocking” a sequence on a 2x2 grid. While
a lesser used authentication method, as compared to PINs
or Android patterns, there is likely a large number of Knock
Code users; we estimate, 700,000–2,500,000 in the US alone.
In this paper, we studied Knock Codes security asking par-
ticipants to select codes on mobile devices in three settings:
a control treatment, a blacklist treatment, and a treatment
with a larger, 2x3 grid. We find that Knock Codes are sig-
nificantly weaker than other deployed authentication, e.g.,
PINs or Android patterns. In a simulated attacker setting,
2x3 grids offered no additional security, but blacklisting was
more beneficial, making Knock Codes’ security similar to
Android patterns. Participants expressed positive perceptions
of Knock Codes, but usability was challenged. SUS values
were “marginal” or “ok” across treatments. Based on these
findings, we recommend deploying blacklists for selecting
a Knock Code because it improves security but has limited
impact on usability perceptions.
1 Introduction
Mobile device unlock authentication has many variations and
there have been extensive user-based studies on the security of
knowledge-based mobile authentication, including Android
graphical unlock patterns [4, 47], PINs [10, 38, 50], as well
as using passwords on mobile devices [40]. The conclusion
of most of this work is that mobile device users, much like
with traditional password selection [18, 28, 39], opt for pre-
dictable and easily guessed authenticators. Additionally, there
have been a number of proposed physical attacks proposed
on knowledge-based mobile authentication, such as smudge
attacks [6], sensor attacks [7,12], vision attacks [51], acoustic
signals [52], and shoulder surfing [5, 19, 22].
∗A version of this article sappear in the proceedings of the Symposium
of Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 2020.
Into this space, LG developed a new mobile authentication
system, Knock Codes, that is designed to combat some of
these attacks1 and provide, per LG’s advertising,2 “perfect
security.” Knock Codes require a user to recall a pre-selected
series of at least 6 and at most 10 knocks3 (or taps) on a 2×2
quadrant which is displayed upon setup and can be entered
with the phone screen on or off. Knock Codes are used less
frequently than PINs or Android patterns, we estimate that
there is likely a large number of Knock Code users, 700,000–
2,500,000 in the US alone.
To evaluate the security and usability of Knock Codes,
we conducted two online user studies on Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk: a preliminary study (n = 218) and a main study
(n = 351), analyzing a total of 1,138 Knock Codes (436 in
the preliminary study and 702 in the main study). In the
main study, we evaluated three between-group treatments: a
control treatment, where participants used the current 2x2
Knock Code interface; a blacklist treatment, where partici-
pants selected 2x2 Knock Codes with some popular codes, as
measured in the preliminary study, being disallowed; and fi-
nally, a big grid treatment, where participants selected Knock
Codes on a larger, 2x3 grid.
We analyzed the selected Knock Codes across treatments
and scenarios for security using standard guessing metrics,
considering both an offline attacker with unlimited guesses
and an online attacker with a limited number of guesses. We
find that Knock Codes, as currently deployed, offer worse
security (51.3 % guessed after 30 attempts) as compared to
other widely available unlock authentication schemes, e.g.,
4-digit PINs (28.0 %), 6-digit PINs (25.4 %) and Android
unlock patterns (36.6 %).
While it seems like a straightforward attempt to increase
security, an expanded Knock Code grid to 2x3 does not in-
crease, and sometimes worsens, security as compared to 2x2
1https://youtu.be/0Imk5JILUc0 (as accessed on Nov. 15, 2019)
2https://youtu.be/NRInfu-Lhnc (as accessed on Nov. 15, 2019)
3In earlier models, like the 2014 LG G2 [46], where this method first
appeared, codes required at least 3 and at most 8. Newer models require 6 to
10 knocks occurring in at least three quadrants.
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Knock Codes. After 30 attempts, a simulated attacker cor-
rectly guesses more 2x3 Knock Codes compared to 2x2 (41 %
vs. 37 %). However, blacklisting common Knock Codes (as
collected in the preliminary study) is more effective at improv-
ing guessing security: only 19 % of these codes were guessed
within 30 attempts in simulation.
Overall, participants perceived Knock Codes (across treat-
ments) as secure; however, among all treatments, partici-
pants were more hesitant to rate Knock Codes as more se-
cure than PINs, Android Unlock Patterns, or alphanumeric
passwords. Despite the fact that participants reported Knock
Codes as “simple” and “memorable” interface, responses to
the SUS [11] questions averaged to “marginal” or just “ok”
usability (69.8, 68.1, and 64.3, for the control 2x2 treatment,
the larger 2x3 treatment, and the blacklist informed 2x2 treat-
ment, respectively). Entry and recall times for Knock Codes
were also much slower than what was reported for PINs and
Android patterns [27, 38], suggesting lower usability.
Based on the survey and analysis, we make the following
contributions and findings:
• We conducted a user study of Knock Codes that consid-
ers usability and security analysis.
• We find that Knock Codes, as currently deployed, of-
fer worse security compared to other available methods,
both in terms of an online and offline guessing analysis.
• We evaluated different designs for Knock Codes, finding
that larger grid sizes offer no benefits (and might actually
be less secure), while blacklisting offers promise for
improving security.
• We analyzed both qualitative and quantitative feedback
of the perceptions of security and usability of Knock
Codes, finding that while there are some features of
Knock Codes that users like, the overall usability was
“ok” or “marginal” and the security perceptions were
weak compared to other available schemes.
These results indicate that users are interested in new forms
of mobile authentication, in particular ones that have options
for unlocking with the display off. However, given the us-
ability and security challenges of Knock Codes, we would
not recommend further deployment as currently configured.
For users and developers who wish to continue to use Knock
Codes, we would recommend using a blacklist to inform se-
lection as it provides increased security with small effects on
usability.
2 Related Work and Background
While Knock Codes have not been broadly studied in the
community, other mobile authentication methods have been
investigated widely, namely PINs [16,20], patterns [4,44,47],
passwords [29, 35], and biometrics [42], as well as adoption
rates [27] and authentication times [26].
Research on user chosen authentication has shown that,
users tend to use predictable and popular choices, regardless
of the authentication method. For instance, 4-digit PINs have
been studied by Bonneau et al. [10]. They concluded that
while 4-digit PINs fare better in user management and choices,
guessing the birthday is an effective strategy to access a user’s
account. Wang et al. confirm that 6-digit PINs have marginally
better security than 4-digit PINs, yet both English and Chinese
users fall into certain patterns when choosing PINs [50].
Markert et al. collected PINs specifically primed for mobile
authentication and showed that 6-digit PINs offer little (and
perhaps worse) benefit than 4-digit PINs against a throttled
attacker. Moreover, non-enforcing blacklists (as deployed
by iOS) do not increase security [38]. We use an enforcing
blacklist in our data collection, as recommend by Markert et
al., and compare Knock Codes to the same RockYou [18] and
Amitay [1] datasets used in Wang et al. and Markert et al.
Patterns, or graphical passwords, have been studied in
multiple contexts, including smudge attacks [6], shoulder-
surfing [5,19,23,37], and user strength perceptions [2,3]. The
selection has also been studied [4, 44, 47], and in all cases
users tend to select predictable patterns. We compare Knock
Codes to results from Uellenbeck et al. [47] and Aviv et al. [4].
There have also been proposals for incorporating more
tactile interaction into mobile authentication. For example,
Deyle and Roth suggested using “tactile pins” [21]. Kuber et
al. [32–34] studied tactile stimuli: a special mouse with a 4x4
matrix of PINs for selecting a “tactile password.” Krombholz
et al. considered extra touch interactions, through pressure-
sensitive touches on iPhones, to enhance PINs [31]. These
user interaction modalities are very different from Knock
Codes. Similar to Knock Codes, "personal identifiable chords"
(PIC) for smartwatches (a multi-touch PIN entered on a 2x2
grid) has been proposed [41]; these differ in setting (smart-
watches) and input type (multi-touch), but PIC could be used
to improve Knock Codes by adding multi-touch.
Along with security, usability is an important facet regard-
ing the adoption of authentication methods, thus, quantifying
user feedback of such methods is pertinent in its analysis [43].
Regarding biometric adoption and perceptions, users consid-
ered biometrics to be more secure than PINs according to
Bhagavatula et al. [8]. In addition, usability factors (such as
poor lighting for facial recognition) contributed to users’ neg-
ative feedback and reluctance to adopt this method versus a
more convenient method such as fingerprint recognition. Even
with biometrics, this can lead to users choosing weaker forms
of knowledge-based authenticators [14].
3 Methodology
We collected data via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
using an online survey whereby participants were directed to
use their mobile devices (checked via the user-agent) to select
two Knock Codes as well as answer general questions about
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Figure 1: Screenshot of a video exploring Knock Codes
(https://youtu.be/tPYypLe8LEU) where a user enters a
Knock Code with the screen off to unlock the phone. This
was used to provide instructions and background information
to users on Knock Codes.
Knock Codes and their demographics. The two Knock Codes
were primed based on different security scenarios, as informed
by prior work of Loge et al. [36]. We found some, but minor,
differences between Knock Codes in each scenarios, similar
to Loge et al.’s findings for Android patterns.
We conducted two studies: a preliminary study and a main
study. We present the main study methodology here (devel-
oped based on the preliminary study). The main difference
between the two studies is that the main study was focused
on participants using mobile devices while the preliminary
allowed participants to use traditional computers. From the
preliminary study, we were able to refine the main study as
well as develop a blacklist of the 30 most common Knock
Codes selected in the preliminary study (see Table 3). We
provide all study material in the Appendices. Both studies
were approved by our institutional review board (IRB).
We found that usage and awareness of Knock Codes are
relatively uncommon. Only 3% of our participants in the main
study responded that they use Knock Codes, see Table 2, and
only 1% reported so in our preliminary study. Despite the low
percentages, this suggests that 700K-1.5M users may deploy
Knock Codes in the US alone, and we would ideally focus our
study just on these users. This is unfortunately not feasible due
to the low concentration on MTurk, and as such, we consider
a broader set of study participants who may (or may not) be
aware of Knock Codes. For those unaware of Knock Codes,
our survey would simulate their first experience, as would be
the case if they were selecting Knock Codes for the first time
on a new device.
Detailed description of survey. The survey consisted of
12 parts, described below. For exact questions and wording,
please refer to the Appendices. We refer to specific questions
within a survey part using the part’s mnemonic and question
number.
1. Overview and Informed Consent: Upon starting the sur-
vey, participants were informed about the nature of the
research (per the requirements of our IRB), and provided
general instructions for proceedings.
2. Device Usage Questions: Participants reported on the
number of mobile devices (as defined by a smartphone
but excluding tablet computers and laptops) they own,
the brands they use, and which types of mobile authen-
tication they use on those devices. We use this data,
normalized to US census data, to estimate Knock Code
usage.
3. Instructions: As we could not expect participants to be
familiar with Knock Codes, we provided detailed instruc-
tions of Knock Codes. This included a GIF animation of
a user entering a Knock Code (see Figure 1), a display
of the entry screen used later in the survey (see Fig-
ure 2), and requirements of Knock Codes (use at least
3 different regions and at least 6 total knocks). We also
introduced the size of the grid, 2x2 for participants who
were assigned to the control or blacklist treatment and
2x3 for the group that tested a larger grid. Those in the
blacklist treatment were not informed of the existence
of the blacklist. A detailed description of the treatments
is given later in this section.
4. Practice: After the instructions, participants could prac-
tice selecting a sample Knock Code and familiarize them-
selves with the interface, before proceeding to the actual
Knock Code selection. It was clearly stated that this stage
was for practice purposes only. Participants practiced on
the appropriate grid size for their treatment and for those
in the blacklist treatment, there was no blacklist in place
yet, i.e., no indication that a code would or would not be
allowed.
5. Scenario Overview: In addition to a treatment, each par-
ticipant was assigned to two scenarios under which they
would select Knock Codes for protection. The scenarios
were presented in random order, but one of the scenarios
was always Device Unlock; the other was either Banking
App or Shopping Cart. These scenarios were adapted
from prior work of Loge et al. [36] for collecting An-
droid patterns. Participants were made aware of both
scenarios before proceeding and the order in which they
would be asked to select Knock Codes. On this page, we
also highlighted that the selected Knock Code will have
to be recalled later, hence, participants should “choose
something that is secure and memorable.”
6. Select and Confirm (2x): Participants were prompted
to select a Knock Code for the scenario, and confirm it
before proceeding. The respective pages are shown in
Figure 2. Participants of the blacklist treatment saw the
warning message shown in Figure 3 if any selection was
disallowed. Table 3 contains the list of blacklisted codes
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(a) con-2x2 & bla-2x2 (b) big-2x3
Figure 2: (a) Interface for selecting 2x2 Knock Codes and (b)
interface for selecting 2x3 Knock Codes. Both designs mimic
the look and feel of LG’s Knock Code implementation.
Figure 3: Blacklist warning display, which mimics blacklist
warnings as used by iOS for PINs.
as collected in the preliminary study.
7. Selection Feedback (2x): After selecting and confirming
a Knock Code, participants were asked for feedback
about their views on the security of their code and any
difficulties in selecting a secure and usable code. Data
was collected in both Likert agreement and through open
answer forms.
8. Security Prompts: Now with more familiarity of Knock
Codes, participants answered questions about the per-
ceived security of Knock Codes, and also compared it
to PINs and Android Unlock Patterns. Participants also
provided qualitative feedback on their security likes and
dislikes related to Knock Codes in general.
9. Usability Prompts: We asked the 10 System Usability
Scale questions [11] related to Knock Codes (plus an
attention test) to assess their usability properties.
10. Recall (2x): Participants were asked to recall their se-
lected Knock Codes. We allowed up to three guesses
for each of the scenarios and forwarded participants if
they were not able to recall their Knock Code within this
limit.
11. Demographic Questions: Participants answered basic
demographic questions about their age, gender, domi-
nant hand, education background, and technology back-
ground. We also included another attention check ques-
tion on this page.
12. Submission: The survey ended with participants answer-
ing an honesty question (i.e., indicated yes/no to “hon-
estly participated in this survey and followed instructions
completely.”). Negative responses were removed from
the results, however, all participants were compensated
for their work.
Treatments. As part of the study we assigned participants
to one of three treatments. In addition to the standard imple-
mentation of LG’s Knock Code, which we refer to as control
2x2 or con-2x2 throughout this paper, we tested two addi-
tional ones.
We first include a blacklist treatment (blacklist informed
2x2 or bla-2x2) which differs from the control 2x2 treatment
by the fact that we blacklisted 30 Knock Codes. These codes
were the most frequently used codes as measured in the pre-
liminary study (see Table 3). The blacklist warning, shown in
cases of a blacklist hit, is depicted in Figure 3 and is a copy of
a warning used by Apple on iOS devices to warn users about
an insecure PIN choice.
We conjecture that by disallowing participants from select-
ing these common codes, the Knock Codes they eventually
select would be stronger (harder to guess). There is a risk with
blacklists as it may increase frustration during the selection
process by having to perform selection multiple times. But
as unlock authentication is a one time event, we wished to
understand if blacklists can improve the security of Knock
Codes.
As another method for increasing security, we considered
a modification to the Knock Code interface. The larger 2x3
treatment (big-2x3) uses a 2x3 instead of 2x2 grid and pro-
vides participants with more options for creating a Knock
Code. Theoretically, this increase makes a substantial differ-
ence with 72,520,440 possible 2x3 Knock Codes of length
6-to-10, as compared to 1,384,872 2x2 Knock Codes of simi-
lar length. The layout is shown in Figure 2b.
We decided to use 2x3 grid rather than a horizontal ex-
tension (3x2) or making a square (3x3) because of the form
factor of the phone’s screen, which is taller than it is wide.
The 2x3 grid offers a natural extension that fits within the
form factor of the screen and mirrors the same interface.
Recruitment. The survey was distributed as an Amazon
Mechanical Turk task, paying $1.25. On average, it took our
participants 8.5 minutes to complete the survey. We ran the
survey over the course of two days in June 2019. We recruited
351 participants, each creating two Knock Codes, for a total of
702 Knock Codes selected and confirmed Knock Codes, but
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Table 1: Overall demographics of the participants from the
main study. Note, zero responses are not shown.
Male Female Other Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
A
ge
18−24 25 7 % 10 3 % 1 0 % 36 10 %
25−34 131 37 % 64 18 % 2 1 % 197 56 %
35−44 46 13 % 31 9 % 0 0 % 77 22 %
45−54 19 6 % 13 3 % 0 0 % 32 9 %
55−64 2 1 % 6 2 % 0 0 % 8 3 %
Prefer not to say 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 1 0 %
D
ex
te
ri
ty
Left-handed 31 9 % 14 4 % 0 0 % 45 13 %
Right-handed 182 52 % 103 29 % 3 1 % 288 82 %
Ambidextrous 9 3 % 7 2 % 0 0 % 16 5 %
Prefer not to say 1 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 2 0 %
L
oc
at
io
n Urban 91 26 % 44 12 % 0 0 % 135 38 %
Suburban 99 29 % 57 16 % 1 0 % 157 45 %
Rural 33 9 % 23 7 % 2 0 % 58 17 %
Prefer not to say 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 1 0 %
E
du
ca
tio
n
High School 36 10 % 6 2 % 1 0 % 43 12 %
Some College 45 13 % 25 7 % 0 0 % 70 20 %
Training 8 3 % 9 3 % 0 0 % 17 6 %
Associates 22 7 % 17 5 % 1 0 % 40 12 %
Bachelor’s 91 26 % 55 16 % 1 0 % 147 42 %
Master’s 19 6 % 10 2 % 0 0 % 29 8 %
Professional 1 0 % 1 0 % 0 0 % 2 0 %
Doctorate 1 0 % 1 0 % 0 0 % 2 0 %
Prefer not to say 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 1 0 %
B
ac
kg
rn
d. Technical 102 30 % 28 8 % 2 0 % 132 38 %
Non Technical 110 31 % 94 27 % 1 0 % 205 58 %
Prefer not to say 11 3 % 2 0 % 1 0 % 14 4 %
Total 223 64 % 124 35 % 4 1 % 351 100 %
also additionally Knock Codes that were not confirmed, either
due to memorability or the blacklists. We do not consider the
practice Knock Codes in our analysis.
The demographics and backgrounds of the participants are
listed in Tables 1 and 2. As usual for Amazon Mechanical
Turk, the participants tended to be younger and predominantly
male, but there was diversity in other categories. A number of
our participants reported using Knock Codes on their devices
as part of their authentication choice. As Knock Codes were
a new interface to many participants, our design models the
scenario where a user acquires and first uses an LG phone to
perform the initial Knock Code set-up.
Estimating US Knock Code Usage. We generalized our
participants’ device usage and authentication methods based
on age and normalized it to the US population using census
data [48, 49]. We saw that LG’s market share in the US had a
range between 8% to 12% among the estimated 285,300,000
smart phone users [17, 45]. Using that, as well as a 95% con-
fidence interval, as our lower and upper bounds, we conclude
that there are potentially many Knock Code users: 728,693
to 2,567,207 in the US alone. We believe though that the
actual adoption rate is most likely on the lower end. While
this may be an optimistic estimate, it still suggests that there
is a substantial number of Knock Code users in the general
public, particularly world wide.
Table 2: Answers of the participants from the main study
regarding their device usage.
Male Female Other Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
N
o.
D
ev
ic
es One device 144 41 % 86 24 % 2 0 % 232 66 %
Two devices 61 18 % 34 10 % 1 0 % 96 28 %
Three devices 14 4 % 4 1 % 0 0 % 18 5 %
Four or more devices 4 1 % 0 0 % 1 0 % 5 1 %
D
ev
ic
e
U
sa
ge
Apple 23 5 % 13 3 % 0 0 % 36 8 %
Google 26 6 % 11 2 % 0 0 % 37 8 %
Huawei 9 2 % 4 1 % 1 0 % 13 3 %
LG 51 11 % 26 6 % 0 0 % 77 22 %
Motorola 40 9 % 16 4 % 0 0 % 56 13 %
Samsung 115 25 % 77 17 % 2 0 % 194 43 %
ZTE 7 1 % 4 1 % 1 0 % 12 2 %
Miscellaneous 23 5 % 6 1 % 0 0 % 29 6 %
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n
U
sa
ge
4 digit PIN 121 21 % 67 13 % 2 0 % 190 34 %
6 digit PIN 19 3 % 10 2 % 1 0 % 30 5 %
6+ digit PIN 12 2 % 5 1 % 0 0 % 17 3 %
Android pattern 69 12 % 22 4 % 0 0 % 91 16 %
Knock Code 9 2 % 4 1 % 0 0 % 13 3 %
Fingerprint 96 17 % 41 7 % 2 0 % 139 24 %
Facial Recognition 33 6 % 14 3 % 0 0 % 47 9 %
Other 0 0 % 1 0 % 0 0 % 1 0 %
No Authentication 17 2 % 20 4 % 1 0 % 38 6 %
Even though Knock Codes are not as widely adopted as
other traditional methods of mobile authentication, it is still
important to study user behavior with real-world, deployed
authentication systems. In addition, on Google Play there are
many Knock Code apps that can be installed on any Android
device, thus not limiting Knock Codes to solely LG devices.
For instance, the most highly rated Knock Code app on An-
droid, “Knock Lock,” boasts more than 1 million installations
and claims that it is an innovative lock screen that “will leave
intruders baffled” [30]. This app is just one among the plethora
of Knock Code knock-off apps that can be found on Google
Play, indicating that this authentication method may have a
higher adoption rate and influence on mobile authentication
systems than appears initially.
4 Limitations
There are a number of limitations associated with our method-
ology and survey design. One such limitation is that the sur-
vey’s recall component occurred within a short time frame
with minimal distraction tasks. While we can report on short-
term memorability of Knock Codes, we cannot report on the
memorability over extended time periods, e.g., days.
However, as a mobile unlock authentication method, users
must recall their codes frequently, hence short-term recall
is still relevant. The increased use of biometrics, which re-
duces the number of knowledge-based recalls, confounds the
issue though, and more research would be needed to better
understand longer-period memorability of Knock Codes.
There are also some limitations on how likely the selected
Knock Codes would be real Knock Codes of real users. We
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Table 3: Top 30 most frequent Knock Codes from the prelim-
inary study, which were used as the blacklist in the bla-2x2
treatment of the main study.
Rank Knock Code No. %
1 28 6.4 %
2 25 5.7 %
3 19 4.4 %
4 7 1.6 %
7 1.6 %
7 1.6 %
7 1.6 %
7 1.6 %
9 6 1.4 %
6 1.4 %
11 5 1.1 %
5 1.1 %
5 1.1 %
5 1.1 %
5 1.1 %
5 1.1 %
5 1.1 %
18 4 0.9 %
4 0.9 %
4 0.9 %
4 0.9 %
4 0.9 %
23 3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
3 0.7 %
believe that the simple interface and the nature of initial device
setup suggests that these Knock Codes would be akin to those
used on real devices. Most of our participants were unfamiliar
with Knock Codes when taking the survey and so would be
new users of LG devices setting up their Knock Code for
the first time. It should also be noted that a few participants
who do use Knock Codes (both in the preliminary study and
main study) reported that they reused their Knock Code in the
survey.
Nevertheless, we attempted to address this limitation and
thus decided to provide different security scenarios for which
participants should create Knock Codes. This technique was
used by Loge et al. [36] when collecting Android Unlock
Patterns. The motivation is that different scenarios, one always
being device unlock, will help users to be more careful about
their choices, similar to how they may be during device setup.
In analyzing the data (Section 6), we did not find significant
differences between the Knock Codes selected under each
scenario for the bla-2x2 treatment but did see some differences
for the con-2x2 and larger 2x3 treatment.
5 Statistics of Knock Codes
The first step in analyzing Knock Codes is to determine fre-
quency statistics. Table 4 displays the 30 most frequent pat-
terns, combined, across the scenarios for three treatments of
the main study. The frequencies which we observed in the
preliminary study are shown in Table 3. The preliminary study
codes and the con-2x2 codes have a lot of overlap, with 42.0%
of the Knock Codes from the preliminary study appearing in
the top-30 most frequent codes in the Control 2x2 treatment.
This helps justify using the most frequent preliminary study
codes as the basis of the blacklist for the bla-2x2 treatment.
Code frequency. The most common Knock Code in our
control dataset is ( f req = 6.9%). It
starts in the upper left corner, follows a left-to-right sequence
and is repeated until the minimum length of 6 is reached. We
observe a similar strategy for the code
( f req = 4.6%) which is the most frequent one in the larger
2x3 treatment. However, participants were able to reach the
minimum length without repeating the pattern because of the
larger grid.
The second most common Knock Code
( f req = 3.9%) in the control 2x2 treatment starts in the
upper left quadrant, moving clockwise. In contrast to this,
( f req = 4.2%), the second most
used code in the larger 2x3 treatment, has different attributes:
participants proceed diagonally over the grid, going down in a
right-left movement for the first diagonal and up in a left-right
movement for the second one. The first half of the third most
used Knock Code ( f req = 3.8%) is
identical, yet, it differs at the second diagonal which follows
a top-down movement instead of bottom-up.
The third most used Knock Code in the control 2x2 treat-
ment ( , f req = 3.5%) pursues a left-to-
right sequence again, however, participants used double taps
to comply with the required minimum length of 6 knocks.
Participants of the blacklist informed 2x2 treatment used
this strategy to an even greater extent: the three most used
Knock Codes all contain multiple double taps and 51.0 %
of all codes created for this treatment include one or more
repeated taps. In contrast to this, only 41.0 % of the codes in
the control 2x2 treatment and 29.0 % of the codes in the larger
2x3 treatment contain at least one repeated tap. Moreover, the
distribution of Knock Codes in the blacklist informed 2x2
treatment is more equal compared to the other two. The most
used Knock Code, , occurs in only 2.6%
of the cases and as can be seen in Table 4 the distribution
flattens the fastest.
To summarize, the frequencies of the Knock Codes show
different characteristics depending on the assigned treatment,
suggesting natural, human tendencies in selection that can be
leveraged in predicting and guessing Knock Codes. We take
advantage of this observation when guessing codes. Partici-
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Table 4: Top 30 most frequent Knock Codes in all three treatments.
All Control 2x2 All Blacklist 2x2 All Large 2x3
Rank Knock Code No. % Rank Knock Code No. % Rank Knock Code No. %
1 16 6.9 % 1 6 2.6 % 1 11 4.6 %
2 9 3.9 % 2 5 2.2 % 2 10 4.2 %
3 8 3.5 % 5 2.2 % 3 9 3.8 %
4 6 2.6 % 4 3 1.3 % 9 3.8 %
5 5 2.2 % 3 1.3 % 5 8 3.4 %
5 2.2 % 3 1.3 % 6 7 2.9 %
6 4 1.7 % 3 1.3 % 6 2.5 %
4 1.7 % 3 1.3 % 8 5 2.1 %
4 1.7 % 3 1.3 % 5 2.1 %
4 1.7 % 3 1.3 % 5 2.1 %
4 1.7 % 3 1.3 % 11 4 1.7 %
4 1.7 % 3 1.3 % 4 1.7 %
13 3 1.3 % 3 1.3 % 4 1.7 %
3 1.3 % 3 1.3 % 14 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 3 1.3 % 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 16 2 0.9 % 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 2 0.9 % 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 2 0.9 % 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 2 0.9 % 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 2 0.9 % 3 1.3 %
3 1.3 % 2 0.9 % 21 2 0.8 %
3 1.3 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
23 2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
2 0.9 % 2 0.9 % 2 0.8 %
pants in the blacklist informed 2x2 group use more repeated
taps whereas codes created for the 2x3 treatment make use of
the larger grid and follow directional patterns. Knock Codes
created for the control 2x2 depict a mix and follow both strate-
gies equally.
Start/end quadrant frequency. Figure 4 and 5 present the
frequency of start and end taps in the Knock Codes. Clearly,
there is a strong tendency to begin codes in the upper-left.
Similar observations were made for Android Graphical Pat-
terns [47] and is likely due to the left-to-right nature of the
English language which is dominant among our participants.
The least common starting points in the preliminary study as
well as the control and blacklist treatment were in the lower
row. In the larger 2x3 treatment, on the other hand, the middle
row is used the least often.
To understand the left/right and up/down shifting of the
Knock Codes’ start locations we mapped the Cartesian coor-
dinate to each quadrant in the grid, where (-1,1) is the upper
left quadrant , (1,1) is the upper right quadrant , (-1,-1)
is the lower left quadrant , and (1,-1) is the lower right
quadrant . Similarly, in the larger 2x3 treatment, we mapped
the coordinates (-1,1), (1,1), (-1,0), (1,0), (-1,-1), and (-1,1) to
the grid spaces, scanning left to right, top to bottom. We then
computed the average x and y coordinate for the start and end
taps, across treatments.
A Shapiro Wilk’s test (p < 0.001) indicated that the gen-
erated frequencies are not normally distributed, so a Mann-
Whitney U test was used to identify any initial significance,
followed by a post-hoc test with Bonferroni correction. We
found significant differences between both the control 2x2
and larger 2x3 treatment (p < 0.001) as well as blacklist in-
formed 2x2 and larger 2x3 (p < 0.001), suggesting that the
larger grid size affected how participants chose to start and
end their codes.
Code length. We also analyzed the Knock Codes with re-
spect to length. The average code length was 6.4, 6.5, and
6.2 in each treatment, con-2x2, bla-2x2, and big-2x3, respec-
tively. We observed statistical differences using ANOVA
( f = 11.57,p < 0.001) between the treatments. In post-hoc
analysis, using pairwise t-test comparison, the difference lies
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71.1% 13.5%
8.5% 6.9%
(a) Preliminary
Study
65.1% 15.9%
12.1% 6.9%
(b) Control 2x2
55.6% 16.8%
13.4% 14.2%
(c) Blacklist 2x2
66.0% 13.9%
3.8% 0.8%
8.0% 7.6%
(d) Large 2x3
Figure 4: Frequency of start quadrants per treatment combined,
across all scenarios. More detailed figures with frequencies for
every single scenario can be found in the Appendices.
14.9% 31.7%
24.1% 29.4%
(a) Preliminary
Study
18.1% 25.4%
29.3% 27.2%
(b) Control 2x2
20.3% 26.3%
28.4% 25.0%
(c) Blacklist 2x2
13.4% 17.6%
10.5% 16.0%
20.2% 22.3%
(d) Large 2x3
Figure 5: Frequency of end quadrants per treatment across all
scenarios. More detailed figures with frequencies for every
single scenario can be found in the Appendices.
primarily in the longer big-2x3 Knock Codes, which was
statistically different from both bla-2x2 (p < 0.001) and the
con-2x2 (p < 0.001). Surprisingly, the larger grid size en-
couraged slightly shorter Knock Codes. Regardless, the vast
majority of Knock Codes were of length 6, which was the
median value, or 8, with a few codes of length 10.
6 Security Analysis
We now analyze the security of Knock Codes. We start by
describing the threat model which we are considering for
the attack. Afterwards, we analyze the security of Knock
Codes by using a perfect knowledge metric in Section 6.1
to define an upper bound on generic attack performance. In
Section 6.2, we simulate the success rate of an simulated
attacker to provide a more realistic security estimation.
Threat Model. We consider a generic, non-targeted at-
tacker that attempts to access an arbitrary victim’s device by
guessing their Knock Code without additional knowledge or
previous observations of the victim. A targeted attacker who
may know the victim’s tendencies or previously observed an
entry (e.g., via a shoulder surfing attack) would likely perform
better than the generic attacker. A generic attacker, though,
provides a lower bound on the scope of attacker performance,
and it also provides a clear comparison point to other reported
results [4, 10, 38, 47, 50] which use the same threat model.
For the security analysis, we employ two different attacker
variations. First is a perfect knowledge attacker, which as-
sumes that the attacker has complete knowledge of the fre-
quency order Knock Codes, from most to least frequent. This
attack is still generic as the same strategy is assumed for every
victim, and it allows one to estimate the security of the Knock
Codes as selected by users. See Section 6.1 for more details.
Second, a simulated attacker who knows a subset of the
Knock Codes and constructs a model based on that observed
distribution. The attacker then attempts to guess a set of arbi-
trary victims’ (unknown) Knock Codes. We use a cross-fold
validation to mimic the attacker, whereby the attacker trains
on a subset of the data and guesses on an unknown test set.
First-Entry 2x2 Codes. Throughout this section, we refer
to a First-Entry 2x2 dataset which contains participants’ first
entered codes in the control and blacklist treatment. These
codes may or may not have been confirmed (i.e., in the second,
confirm entry screen) either due to lack of recall or because
of the blacklist. We include this dataset, as it offers the per-
spective of an ideal user choice for how the authenticator may
have been selected in the absence of external influences. As
we expected, this dataset is slighter more secure than that of
the confirmed control 2x2 codes and offers insights into how
users compromise on security to gain more memorable codes.
6.1 Perfect Knowledge Strength Estimations
We consider the guessing strength of Knock Codes against a
perfect knowledge attacker as described by Bonneau et al. [9].
A perfect knowledge attack depicts the upper bound for an at-
tack as it assumes that the attacker knows the attacked dataset
and always guesses in the ideal order, that is, the Knock Code
with the next highest frequency. This approach has been regu-
larly applied to analyzing mobile authentication, such as for
Android patterns [4, 44, 47] and PINs [38, 50].
As use two different perfect-knowledge guessability met-
rics to evaluate Knock Codes, one based on an offline attack
model and one based on an online (or throttled) attack model.
An offline attack model assumes that the attacker can guess
as many times as possible, while an online attack model as-
sumes an attacker with a limited number of attempts. The
online attack model better matches the realities of mobile
authentication, where users typically have a maximal number
of attempts before the device is locked out. The offline attack
model, on the other hand, provides a more holistic approach
to measuring the security of a set of user-chosen passwords.
For an offline attack metric, we use partial guessing entropy
or α-guesswork (G˜α). Partial guessing entropy estimates the
amount of guesswork that is needed to guess a fraction α
of all codes. The Min-entropy H∞ depicts a special case as
it is only based on the most frequent Knock Code. As an
online (or throttled) attack metric, we use β-success rate. It
essentially measures what fraction of codes would be guessed
if the attacker only had β guesses, e.g., λ3 considers an attack
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Table 5: Comparison of the guessing metrics for a perfect-
knowledge attacker between the treatments and other schemes.
A comparison between the scenarios is shown in Appendix B.
Online Guessing (Success %) Offline Guessing (bits)
Dataset λ3 λ10 λ30 H∞ G˜0.1 G˜0.2 G˜0.5
All Control 2x2 14.2 % 28.0 % 51.3 % 3.86 4.20 4.79 5.69
All Blacklist 2x2 6.9 % 16.0 % 35.4 % 5.27 5.79 6.03 6.72
All Large 2x3† 12.9 % 31.5 % 53.4 % 4.40 4.53 4.70 5.54
All First-Entry 2x2† 10.8 % 22.8 % 43.1 % 4.40 4.79 5.35 6.19
3x3 Pattern [4]† 8.6 % 19.4 % 36.6 % 4.69 5.21 5.72 6.76
4x4 Pattern [4]† 7.8 % 18.1 % 32.3 % 5.05 5.47 5.92 7.00
4-digit PINs [1]† 9.5 % 17.2 % 28.0 % 4.40 5.14 6.05 7.21
6-digit PINs [50]† 13.4 % 16.8 % 25.4 % 3.10 3.10 6.38 7.32
†: For a fair comparison we downsampled all marked datasets to the size of Control
and Blacklist (232 Knock Codes).
which is limited to 3 guesses.
Table 5 shows the guessing results for our three treatments
as well as the combined datasets First-Entry 2x2. As an addi-
tional comparison we included datasets from previous studies
for Android patterns [4] as well as 4- and 6- digit PINs [1,50].
Because the datasets all differ in size which would influence
the results, we downsampled all marked datasets to the size
of control 2x2 and blacklist 2x2 (232 entries) and calculated
the statistics for the samples. To rule out any sampling bias,
we repeated this process 500 times, removed outliers using
Tukey fences with k = 1.5, and report the median value of the
remaining set in Table 5. With a 95 % confidence level the
margin of error is lower than 0.3 % for the online guessing
and lower than 0.1 bits for the offline case.
Across all comparisons, we find that Knock Codes in the
control 2x2 are significantly weaker in terms of their guess-
ability. This means, Knock Codes as they are currently de-
ployed are more guessable than both 4- and 6-digit PINs as
well as Android patterns. When considering the First-Entry
dataset, the differences are less distinct, but even in this ideal
case the inferiority of Knock Codes remains.
Surprisingly, increasing the size of the key space by en-
larging the grid size to 2x3 offers only little security gain.
Moreover, in some cases increasing the grid size may even
decrease security. This is most apparent when considering a
throttled attacker. After 10 guesses, 31.5% of the larger 2x3
codes are guessed compared to 28.0 % for the control 2x2
codes. A similar observation can be made after 30 guesses,
53.4 % of larger 2x3 codes are guessed compared to 51.3 %
of control 2x2 codes.
Future works needs to examine why larger Knock Codes
performed so poorly, but a similar phenomenon was observed
by Aviv et al. with increasing Android patterns from 3x3 to
4x4 grid sizes [4]. Aviv et al. conjectured, and we do so here as
well, that there may be a false sense of security that the larger
set of choices offers, whereby users believe their individual
choice matter less in the face of the increased number of
possibilities. Analyzing other grid sizes, such as 3x2 or 3x3,
would offer additional insight; nevertheless, it is surprising
that providing more complexity in how to select Knock Codes
does not increase the security as one might expect.
Finally, we observed strong security improvement with the
introduction of a blacklist. As compared to the con-2x2, the
blacklist cuts the success rate of an attacker within the first
30 attempts by 30 % to 50 % and increases the guesswork
by ~1.5 bits when considering an offline attacker. While the
blacklist clearly encouraged more diverse choices, it also had
the side effect of increasing user frustration and usability, as
we describe later in Section 7.
6.2 Simulated Attacker Strength
We are also interested in modeling a more realistic, limited-
knowledge attacker that had access to a subset of training
data and attempted to guess some test set of unknown data: a
simulated attacker.
A simulated attacker must model Knock Codes from a train-
ing set to predict a test set, we used a three-gram Markov
model probability estimator for the likelihood of a given
Knock Code, based on the empirical observations in the test
set. This is a standard approach when analyzing user chose
secrets, e.g., passwords [13, 24], PINs [50], or Android Pat-
terns [4, 47]. In order to encode the start and end transitions,
we defined special symbols for transitions to ending/starting
nodes. This can be defined more formally:
x = {x−(g−1), . . . , x−1, x0, x1, . . . , xn, . . . , xn+g−1}
where x is the Knock Code of length n with first knock x1,
and g is the gram size. If i ≤ 0 or i > n, then this indicates that
xi is a start or end transition state. These extra states are used
to capture the early and late transitions taken by a user, for
example, for the following Knock Code , we
would produce the following set of tri-grams, where ⊥ is a
start state and > is an end state: (⊥ ⊥ ), (⊥ ), (
), ( ), ( >) ( > >).
Using the transition probabilities, as measured in the train-
ing data, the attacker can calculate a likelihood measure of
a Knock Code by considering the following Markov model
formulation,
P(x) = P(len(x)) ·P(start(x)) ·P(end(x))·
n+(g−1)∏
i=−(g−1)
P(xi . . . xi+g | xi−1 . . . xi−1+g)
(1)
where P(·) is the probability function, len(x) is the length
function, start(x) is the start function, and end(x) is the end
function. These are our prior probabilities that capture the
likelihood of a given length, start quadrant, and end quadrant.
The transition probabilities are captured using the conditional
probabilities of each transition between each sub-sequence
of length g, given the prior state. As not all transitions are
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Table 6: Guessing performance of a simulated attacker.
Blacklist Hits 3 Guesses 10 Guesses 30 Guesses
Dataset Codes No. % No. % No. % No. %
All Control 2x2 232 - 33 14 % 44 19 % 85 37 %
Device Unlock 116 - 20 17 % 28 24 % 42 36 %
Banking App. 56 - 0 0 % 4 7 % 8 14 %
Shopping Cart 60 - 9 15 % 11 18 % 23 38 %
All Blacklist 2x2 232 53 23 % 9 4 % 14 6 % 45 19 %
Device Unlock 116 40 35 % 1 1 % 1 1 % 5 4 %
Banking App. 57 8 14 % 3 5 % 3 5 % 3 5 %
Shopping Cart 59 5 9 % 3 5 % 3 5 % 5 9 %
All Large 2x3 238 - 24 10 % 62 26 % 97 41 %
Device Unlock 119 - 6 5 % 37 31 % 44 37 %
Banking App. 63 - 1 2 % 6 10 % 15 23 %
Shopping Cart 56 - 5 9 % 10 18 % 15 27 %
All First-Entry 2x2 464 - 42 9 % 83 18 % 127 27 %
Device Unlock 232 - 31 13 % 47 20 % 84 36 %
Banking App. 113 - 5 4 % 16 14 % 27 24 %
Shopping Cart 119 - 12 10 % 20 17 % 29 24 %
represented in our dataset, we used constant smoothing to
avoid zero probabilities.
The simulated attackers guessing routine, given a training
set, is to (1) create a Markov model of the training data; (2)
guess patterns in frequency order of the training set, with ties
broken by the likelihood estimation; and (3) guess from a
set of additional Knock Codes (not in the training set) sorted
based on the likelihood estimation. For (3), we generated a
list of all length 6-to-8 Knock Codes for the 2x2 and 2x3
grid sizes, excluding those in our training set that were previ-
ously guessed. This accounted for 1,384,872 and 72,520,440
additional 2x2 and 2x3 Knock Codes that could be guessed, re-
spectively. In our blacklist treatment, we assumed the attacker
had knowledge of the blacklist.
The results of our simulated attacker are presented in Ta-
ble 6, and a graphical representation is provided in Figure 6.
We report on the average of five randomized cross-fold vali-
dations. As expected, the simulated attacker performs worse
than the perfect-knowledge attacker, but we find similar re-
sults comparing across treatments. Notably, the 2x3 Knock
Codes offer little, or worse, security while there is marked
improvement for the blacklist informed 2x2 Knock Codes.
7 Usability of Knock Codes
In this section, we focus on usability metrics of Knock Codes.
We first report results on the setup and recall times. After-
wards we will focus on memorability and recall rates within
our study, followed by the qualitative and quantitative re-
sponses to security and usability prompts.
7.1 Setup and Recall Times
Table 7 presents the average selection and recall times, as well
as number attempts, needed to select a Knock Code. Outliers
were removed using Tukey fences with k = 1.5.
Participants needed on average 16.2 s and 18.4 s to select
and confirm a 2x2 and 2x3 Knock Code, respectively. This
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(b) Guessing performance of a throttled attacker.
Figure 6: Guessing performance of a simulated attacker
against the different treatments based on the numbers of
guesses.
is faster than the blacklist treatment (22.5 s), where partici-
pants had to make more attempts due to blacklisting (1.5 vs.
1.1 attempts). In comparison, setting up a 4- or 6-digit PIN
takes on average only 7.9 and 11.5 seconds respectively [38]
which is significantly faster than Knock Codes. While the
described discrepancy between Knock Codes and PINs is
distinct, the numbers for PINs may be lower since users are
presumably more familiar with PINs as compared to Knock
Codes. The differences may decrease with increased familiar-
ity with Knock Codes.
In terms of the recall, which more closely mimics entry,
the 2x2 (7.2 s per attempt) and 2x3 Knock Codes (7.1 s per
attempt) are more efficient than Knock Codes selected with
a blacklist (7.4 s per attempt). With 1.2 attempts per entry,
it took participants 11.3 seconds to enter their Knock Codes
for the blacklist treatment. Compared to entering an Android
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Table 7: The average time and number of attempts required for setup and recall. The standard deviation is shown in brackets.
Setup Recall
Treatment Time Attempts Time/Attempt Time Attempts Time/Attempt
Control 2x2 16.2 s (7.7 s) 1.1 (0.4) 15.6 s (7.6 s) 8.8 s (4.5 s) 1.1 (0.7) 7.2 s (2.7 s)
Blacklist 2x2 22.5 s (13.7 s) 1.5 (1.1) 18.3 s (8.6 s) 11.3 s (6.7 s) 1.2 (0.8) 7.4 s (2.6 s)
Large 2x3 18.4 s (11.0 s) 1.1 (0.5) 17.4 s (8.4 s) 8.4 s (4.1 s) 1.1 (0.6) 7.1 s (2.6 s)
pattern (3.0 s) or a PIN (4.7 s) [27], clear usability issues with
Knock Codes emerge as they may be nearly twice as slow
for entry. With greater use of Knock Codes, these differences
may decrease, but it is unlikely that Knock Codes will be as
efficient to enter as patterns or PINs.
7.2 Memorability
We will now go into more details on the memorability as it de-
picts an important benchmark for any authentication method.
We analyzed the memorability of Knock Codes by looking
at the recall rates at the end of the survey. While this is an
imperfect measure for the memorability, as the survey took
most participants less than 10 minutes to complete, it does
speak to potential underlying usability issues, particularly if
codes were not properly recalled in this short window.
We separated the recall rates based on each treatment. The
con-2x2 treatment participants successfully recalled their
codes 88.8 % of the time. The participants with the larger
2x3 grid had higher recall rates of 92.9 %, which may suggest
an interesting usability vs. security trade-off as this group
chose in shorter and also some of the weakest Knock Codes.
We did not find significant differences between the con-2x2
and big-2x3 recall rates using a χ2 test. We would expect long
term memorability rates to be equally high, but further study
would be needed to confirm that conjecture.
The worst recall rate came from participants in the bla-2x2
treatment: 80.6 % successfully recalled their Knock Code, and
the result was significantly different than the other two recall
rates (p < 0.0001 for both comparison tests). This could be
attributed to the impact of the blacklist, where participants
who hit the blacklist had lower recall rates (60.0 %) than those
that did not (62.1 %). Most likely, the blacklist affected users
in two ways. First, participants who chose blacklisted codes
were forced to select multiple codes until landing on one
that was not blacklisted. The average number of blacklisting
events per user who hit the blacklist was 1.4. Second, that
final Knock Code chosen ended up being more complex (as
evident in the prior section), and thus harder to recall. Again,
this suggests a clear trade-off between usability and security.
We also analyzed the number of attempts to successfully
recall a Knock Code. We found no statistical difference across
all treatments between the attempts made in recalling the first
or second scenario Knock Code correctly. In the big-2x3 treat-
ment and the con-2x2 treatment, participants took on average
1.1 attempts when recalling a Knock Code correctly, with 3 at-
tempts as the maximum. For the bla-2x2 group, users took on
average 1.2 attempts to correctly recall a Knock Code, again
having a maximum of 3 attempts. Again, we find bla-2x2‘s
result to be significantly different in terms of the number of
attempts made in the other treatments (p < 0.001 vs. big-2x3
and p < 0.001 vs. con-2x2), thus showing that the blacklist
has an impact on recalling Knock Codes, even for those par-
ticipants that eventually correctly do so. It is important to note
though, that users had a maximum limit of 3 attempts to recall
their code before we considered it “cannot be recalled” for
the purpose of expediting the survey.
We also analyzed how participants failed to recall their
Knock Codes by calculating the average edit distances be-
tween the submitted code and the true code for both recalls
attempts, one for each scenario. We determined that there was
no statistical difference between the average edit distances
among treatments. The average edit distance between correct
and incorrect recalls was 3.6, suggesting that when users get
a code wrong, they get it wrong by a large margin, as the
median length Knock Code is 6.
7.3 User Responses
Users provided their opinions and insights regarding Knock
Codes’ usability and security. We coded these free responses
using two independent reviewers where disputes in coding
were resolved until consensus was reached. The specific codes
and their frequencies are presented in the Appendices.
Overall Knock Codes were perceived positively by users,
citing that they were “Easy,” “Quick,” and “Hard to Guess.”
The uniqueness of Knock Codes also appealed to users who
indicated they especially liked the fact that it is a “Discreet”
and “Secure” authentication method which can be inconspic-
uous and hidden from others.
For many of the participants, this was a new method of
authentication, and they employed various tactics when choos-
ing their Knock Codes. We observed such strategies in de-
termining memorable yet secure codes. To make the Knock
Code more memorable, the majority of users opted to use
some sort of “Pattern” or “Variation” that would be “Sim-
ple.” Other techniques users employed include “Directional,”
“Shape,” “Game,” and “Repeated.” Often, users would create
codes based on something “Personal” to them, such as the
letter of a word that had meaning to the user.
While many users did not have a specific strategy for se-
curity and still focused on making their code “Easy to Re-
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bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
Knock Codes are more secure than PIN codes.
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bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
Knock Codes are more secure than alphanumeric passwords.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
Knock Codes are more secure than Android patterns.
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bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3
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Figure 7: Likert response to comparisons to other mobile
authentication methods.
member” as a main priority, others determined that using “All
Quadrants” or “ Multiple Regions,” as well as making the
code “Long” or “Random” or being “Unexpected” and “Dif-
ferent” would secure their codes. Making their codes “Hard
to Guess” often included attempts to obfuscate the number
of clicks and the regions, using speed and potentially unpre-
dictable tactics. Users continued to use similar tactics for
memorability to double as security in their Knock Codes, for
instance having “Repeated” regions.
Upon comparing Knock Codes with other forms of secu-
rity, on average users found passwords, PINs, and Android
patterns to be more secure than Knock Codes (see Figure 7).
Overall, users found Knock Codes adequately secure, i.e., be-
ing difficult to hack, resistant to smudge attacks and shoulder
surfing. However they were not completely convinced about
Knock Codes’ security. Users expressed what they disliked
overall, specifically that they found Knock Codes “Hard to
Remember” and “Insecure,” paving the way for an attacker
to easily guess a Knock Code. They also found the interface
provided “No improvement” and disliked how it was “ Hard
to type-in” the Knock Codes.
To have a more general opinion of overall usability of
Knock Codes, we employed the System Usability Scale (SUS).
The full Likert responses are found in the Appendices. The
average response for the con-2x2 treatment is 69.8, the big-
2x3 is 68.1, and the bla-2x2 is 64.3. These scores are generally
rated as “ok” or “marginal,” with only the control treatment
potentially offering some above average usability.
8 Discussion
As reported above, while most participants offered some posi-
tive thoughts, their perception of the security of Knock Codes
lagged behind other deployed options, and the SUS values
for all schemes were “ok” or “marginal.” There were some
positive feedback on Knock Codes which suggests an open-
ness to new designs in mobile authentication, particularly to
authentication that can be entered while the phone screen is
off. There was also increased perceptions of security from
targeted attacks, e.g., via shoulder surfing [5, 19, 22]. It is rea-
sonable to view Knock Codes as offering new design concepts
that can ultimately improve mobile authentication.
However, we find that Knock Codes, as currently deployed,
provide weaker security than other available knowledge-
based, mobile unlock authentication, such as 4-/6-digit PINs
and Android patterns. This is far from the “perfect security”
promised by the LG’s advertisement of Knock Codes. As
such, we cannot recommend current deployment of Knock
Codes as compared to alternative authentication options.
Our results also indicate that a straightforward improve-
ment like increasing the grid size to 2x3 may offer little, or
worse security outcomes. Blacklisting common Knock Codes
does provide more resilience to a throttled attacker, as has
been found in password authentication [25] and PINs [38].
Blacklisting runs the risk of increasing user frustration during
selection, but since selecting a Knock Code is a one-time
event, the usability trade-off of adding a blacklist to Knock
Codes may be extremely worthwhile if Knock Codes continue
to be available to LG users. It may also be worthwhile for
designers to invest in other methods for improving Knock
Code selection, such as forcing users to start or end at given
quadrants, similar to SysPal [15], or using multi-touch, like
chords [41].
9 Conclusion
We performed the first comprehensive user study and security
analysis of user-chosen Knock Codes using a three-treetment,
between groups study: a control 2x2 treatment, a blacklist 2x2
treatment, and a 2x3 treatment. We find that Knock Codes pro-
vide weaker security than other mobile unlock authentication,
such as 4-digit PINs, 6-digit PINs, and Android pattern, and
that increasing the grid size offered little (or worse) security
outcomes, while the addition of a blacklist of common codes
substantially increased the security against a throttled attacker.
However, Knock Codes suffered in terms of usability, both in
terms of entry/recall time and user perception.
Acknowledgments Thank you Timothy Forman, Maximilian
Golla and Genry Krichevsky. This material is based upon work
supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants Nos.
1845300 and 1617584; the research training group “Human Centered
Systems Security” (NERD.nrw) sponsored by the state of North
Rhine-Westphalia, Germany; and the Army Research Laboratory
Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-13-2-0045 (ARL Cyber
Security CRA).
12
References
[1] Daniel Amitay. Most Common iPhone Passcodes, June
2011. http://danielamitay.com/blog/2011/6/
13/most-common-iphone-passcodes, as of June 11,
2020.
[2] Panagiotis Andriotis, Theo Tryfonas, and George
Oikonomou. Complexity Metrics and User Strength
Perceptions of the Pattern-Lock Graphical Authentica-
tion Method. In Conference on Human Aspects of In-
formation Security, Privacy and Trust, HAS ’14, pages
115–126. Springer, Heraklion, Crete, Greece, June 2014.
[3] Panagiotis Andriotis, Theo Tryfonas, George
Oikonomou, and Can Yildiz. A Pilot Study on
the Security of Pattern Screen-Lock Methods and
Soft Side Channel Attacks. In ACM Conference on
Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks,
WiSec ’13, pages 1–6, Budapest, Hungary, April 2013.
ACM.
[4] Adam J. Aviv, Devon Budzitowski, and Ravi Kuber. Is
Bigger Better? Comparing User-Generated Passwords
on 3x3 vs. 4x4 Grid Sizes for Android’s Pattern Unlock.
In Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
ACSAC ’15, pages 301–310, Los Angeles, California,
USA, December 2015. ACM.
[5] Adam J. Aviv, John T. Davin, Flynn Wolf, and Ravi Ku-
ber. Towards Baselines for Shoulder Surfing on Mobile
Authentication. In Annual Conference on Computer
Security Applications, ACSAC ’17, pages 486–498, Or-
lando, Florida, USA, December 2017. ACM.
[6] Adam J. Aviv, Katherine Gibson, Evan Mossop, Matt
Blaze, and Jonathan M. Smith. Smudge Attacks on
Smartphone Touch Screens. In USENIX Workshop
on Offensive Technologies, WOOT ’10, pages 1–7,
Washington, District of Columbia, USA, August 2010.
USENIX.
[7] Adam J. Aviv, Benjamin Sapp, Matt Blaze, and
Jonathan M. Smith. Practicality of Accelerometer Side
Channels on Smartphones. In Annual Computer Secu-
rity Applications Conference, ACSAC ’12, pages 41–50,
Orlando, Florida, USA, December 2012. ACM.
[8] Chandrasekhar Bhagavatula, Blase Ur, Kevin Iacovino,
Su Mon Kywey, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Marios Sav-
vides. Biometric Authentication on iPhone and Android:
Usability, Perceptions, and Influences on Adoption. In
Workshop on Usable Security, USEC ’15, San Diego,
California, USA, February 2015. ISOC.
[9] Joseph Bonneau. The Science of Guessing: Analyzing
an Anonymized Corpus of 70 Million Passwords. In
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’12, pages
538–552, San Jose, California, USA, May 2012. IEEE.
[10] Joseph Bonneau, Sören Preibusch, and Ross Anderson.
A Birthday Present Every Eleven Wallets? The Secu-
rity of Customer-Chosen Banking PINs. In Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, FC ’12, pages 25–40,
Kralendijk, Bonaire, February 2012. Springer.
[11] John Brooke. SUS: A Quick and Dirty Usability Scale.
Usability Evaluation in Industry, pages 189–194, 1996.
[12] Liang Cai and Hao Chen. TouchLogger: Inferring
Keystrokes on Touch Screen from Smartphone Motion.
In Workshop on Hot Topics in Security, HotSec ’11,
Berkeley, California, USA, August 2011. USENIX.
[13] Claude Castelluccia, Markus Dürmuth, and Daniele Per-
ito. Adaptive Password-Strength Meters from Markov
Models. In Symposium on Network and Distributed Sys-
tem Security, NDSS ’12, San Diego, California, USA,
February 2012. ISOC.
[14] Ivan Cherapau, Ildar Muslukhov, Nalin Asanka, and
Konstantin Beznosov. On the Impact of Touch ID on
iPhone Passcodes. In Symposium on Usable Privacy and
Security, SOUPS ’15, pages 257–276, Ottawa, Canada,
July 2015. USENIX.
[15] Geumhwan Cho, Jun Ho Huh, Junsung Cho, Seongyeol
Oh, Youngbae Song, and Hyoungshick Kim. SysPal:
System-Guided Pattern Locks for Android. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’17, pages 338–
356, San Jose, California, USA, May 2017. IEEE.
[16] N.L. Clarke and S.M. Furnell. Authentication of Users
on Mobile Telephones – A Survey of Attitudes and Prac-
tices. Computers & Security, 24(7):519–527, October
2005.
[17] Comscore, Inc. Top OEMs - Share of Smartphone
Subscribers 3 Month Avg. Ending Nov. 2019
vs. 3 Month Avg. Ending Sep. 2019, September
2019. https://www.comscore.com/Insights/
Rankings#tab_mobile_smartphone_oems, as of
June 11, 2020.
[18] Nik Cubrilovic. RockYou Hack: From Bad To
Worse, December 2009. https://techcrunch.com/
2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-
facebook-passwords/, as of June 11, 2020.
[19] Alexander De Luca, Marian Harbach, Emanuel von
Zezschwitz, Max-Emanuel Maurer, Bernhard Ewald
Slawik, Heinrich Hussmann, and Matthew Smith. Now
You See Me, Now You Don’t: Protecting Smartphone
Authentication from Shoulder Surfers. In ACM Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’14,
pages 2937–2946, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, April 2014.
ACM.
13
[20] Alexander De Luca, Roman Weiss, and Heiko Drewes.
Evaluation of Eye-Gaze Interaction Methods for Secu-
rity Enhanced PIN-Entry. In Australasian Computer-
Human Interaction Conference, OZCHI ’07, pages 199–
202, Adelaide, Australia, November 2007. ACM.
[21] Travis Deyle and Volker Roth. Accessible Authentica-
tion via Tactile PIN Entry. Computer Graphics Topics,
3:24–26, 2006.
[22] Malin Eiband, Mohamed Khamis, Emanuel von
Zezschwitz, Heinrich Hussmann, and Florian Alt.
Understanding Shoulder Surfing in the Wild:Stories
from Users and Observers. In ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’17, pages
4254–4265, Denver, Colorado, USA, May 2017. ACM.
[23] Alain Forget, Sonia Chiasson, and Robert Biddle.
Shoulder-Surfing Resistance with Eye-Gaze Entry
inCued-Recall Graphical Passwords. In ACM Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’10,
pages 1107–1110, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, April 2010.
ACM.
[24] Maximilian Golla and Markus Dürmuth. On the Accu-
racy of Password Strength Meters. In ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’18,
pages 1567–1582, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, October
2018. ACM.
[25] Hana Habib, Jessica Colnago, William Melicher, Blase
Ur, Sean M. Segreti, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and
Lorrie Faith Cranor. Password Creation in the Pres-
ence of Blacklists. In Workshop on Usable Security,
USEC ’17, San Diego, California, USA, February 2017.
ISOC.
[26] Marian Harbach, Alexander De Luca, and Serge Egel-
man. The Anatomy of Smartphone Unlocking: A Field
Study of Android Lock Screens. In ACM Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’16,
pages 4806–4817, San Jose, California, USA, May 2016.
ACM.
[27] Marian Harbach, Emanuel von Zezschwitz, Andreas
Fichtner, Alexander De Luca, and Matthew Smith. It’s
a Hard Lock Life: A Field Study of Smartphone
(Un)Locking Behavior and Risk Perception. In Sym-
posium on Usable Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’14,
pages 213–230, Menlo Park, California, USA, July 2014.
USENIX.
[28] Patrick Kelley, Saranga Kom, Michelle L. Mazurek,
Rich Shay, Tim Vidas, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin,
Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Julio López. Guess Again (and
Again and Again): Measuring Password Strength by
Simulating Password-Cracking Algorithms. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’12, pages 523–
537, San Jose, California, USA, May 2012. IEEE.
[29] Daniel V. Klein. “Foiling the Cracker”: A Survey Of,
and Improvements To, Password Security. In UNIX
Security Workshop, UNIX ’90, pages 5–14, Portland,
Oregon, USA, August 1990. USENIX.
[30] Knock Lock. Knock Lock Screen - Applock,
2020. https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.knocklock.applock&hl=en_US,
as of June 11, 2020.
[31] Katharina Krombholz, Thomas Hupperich, and Thorsten
Holz. Use the Force: Evaluating Force-Sensitive Au-
thentication for Mobile Devices. In Symposium on Us-
able Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’16, pages 207–219,
Denver, Colorado, USA, July 2016. USENIX.
[32] Ravi Kuber and Shiva Sharma. Toward Tactile Authen-
tication for Blind Users. In ACM SIGACCESS Con-
ference on Computers and Accessibility, ASSETS ’10,
pages 289–290, Orlando, Florida, USA, October 2010.
ACM.
[33] Ravi Kuber and Wai Yu. Feasibility Study of Tactile-
Based Authentication. International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies, 68(3):158–181, March 2010.
[34] Ravi Kuber and Wai Yu. Toward Tactile Authentication
for Blind Users. In International Conference on Human
Haptic Sensing and Touch Enabled Computer Applica-
tions, EuroHaptics ’10’, pages 314–319, Amsterdam,
Netherlands, July 2010. Springer.
[35] William C. Lindsey and Chak Ming Chie. A Survey of
Digital Phase-Locked Loops. Proceedings of the IEEE,
69(4):410–431, April 1981.
[36] Marte Løge, Markus Dürmuth, and Lillian Røstad. On
User Choice for Android Unlock Patterns. In European
Workshop on Usable Security, EuroUSEC ’16, Darm-
stadt, Germany, July 2016. ISOC.
[37] Shushuang Man, Dawei Hong, and Manton Matthews. A
Shoulder-Surfing Resistant Graphical Password Scheme
– WIW. In International Conference on Security and
Management, SAM ’03, pages 105–111, Las Vegas,
Nevada, USA, June 2003. CSREA Press.
[38] Philipp Markert, Daniel V. Bailey, Maximilian Golla,
Markus Dürmuth, and Adam J. Aviv. This PIN Can
Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smart-
phone Unlock PINs. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, SP ’20, pages 1525–1542, San Francisco,
California, USA, May 2020. IEEE.
14
[39] Michelle L. Mazurek, Saranga Komanduri, Timothy Vi-
das, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor,
Patrick Gage Kelley, Richard Shay, and Blase Ur. Mea-
suring Password Guessability for an Entire University.
In Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity, CCS ’13, pages 173–186, Berlin, Germany, October
2013. ACM.
[40] William Melicher, Darya Kurilova, Sean M. Segreti,
Pranshu Kalvani, Richard Shay, Blase Ur, Lujo Bauer,
Nicolas Christin, Lorrie Faith Cranor, and Michelle L.
Mazurek. Usability and Security of Text Passwords on
Mobile Devices. In ACM Conference on Human Factors
in Computing Systems, CHI ’16, pages 527–539, Santa
Clara, California, USA, May 2016. ACM.
[41] Ian Oakley, Jun Ho Huh, Junsung Cho, Geumhwan Cho,
Rasel Islam, and Hyoungshick Kim. The Personal Iden-
tification Chord: A Four Button Authentication System
for Smartwatches. In ACM Asia Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security, ASIA CCS ’18,
pages 75–87, Incheon, Republic of Kore, June 2018.
ACM.
[42] Salil Prabhakar, Sharath Pankanti, and Anil K Jain. Bio-
metric Recognition: Security and Privacy Concerns.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 1(2):63–69, March 2003.
[43] Florian Schaub, Ruben Deyhle, and Michael Weber.
Password Entry Usability and Shoulder Surfing Sus-
ceptibility on Different Smartphone Platforms. In In-
ternational Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Mul-
timedia, MUM ’12, pages 13:1–13:10, Ulm, Germany,
December 2012. ACM.
[44] Youngbae Song, Geumhwan Cho, Seongyeol Oh, Hy-
oungshick Kim, and Jun Ho Huh. On the Effective-
ness of Pattern Lock Strength Meters: Measuring the
Strength of Real World Pattern Locks. In ACM Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’15,
pages 2343–2352, Seoul, Republic of Korea, April 2015.
ACM.
[45] Team Counterpoint. US Smartphone Mar-
ket Share: By Quarter, November 2019.
https://www.counterpointresearch.com/us-
market-smartphone-share/, as of June 11, 2020.
[46] Kevin C. Tofel. LG G2 and G Flex Phones Getting
the Knock Code Wake and Unlock Feature, March
2014. https://gigaom.com/2014/03/25/lg-g2-
and-g-flex-phones-getting-the-knock-code-
wake-and-unlock-feature/, as of June 11, 2020.
[47] Sebastian Uellenbeck, Markus Dürmuth, Christopher
Wolf, and Thorsten Holz. Quantifying the Security
of Graphical Passwords: The Case of Android Unlock
Patterns. In ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, CCS ’13, pages 161–172, Berlin,
Germany, November 2013. ACM.
[48] U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. An-
nual Estimates of the Resident Population by Single
Year of Age and Sex for the United States: April 1,
2010 to July 1, 2018 , 2018 Population Estimates,
June 2019. https://factfinder.census.gov/
bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP/2018/PEPSYASEXN?#, as
of June 11, 2020.
[49] U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. An-
nual Estimates of the Resident Population for Se-
lected Age Groups by Sex for the United States,
States, Counties, and Puerto Rico Commonwealth
and Municipios: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018, June
2019. https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/
table/1.0/en/PEP/2018/PEPAGESEX?#, as of June
11, 2020.
[50] Ding Wang, Qianchen Gu, Xinyi Huang, and Ping
Wang. Understanding Human-Chosen PINs: Character-
istics, Distribution and Security. In ACM Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security,
ASIA CCS ’17, pages 372–385, Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, April 2017. ACM.
[51] Guixin Ye, Zhanyong Tang, Dingyi Fang, Xiaojiang
Chen, Kwang In Kim, Ben Taylor, and Zheng Wang.
Cracking Android Pattern Lock in Five Attempts. In
Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security,
NDSS ’17, San Diego, California, USA, February 2017.
ISOC.
[52] Man Zhou, Qian Wang, Jingxiao Yang, Qi Li, Feng Xiao,
Zhibo Wang, and Xiaofen Chen. PatternListener: Crack-
ing Android Pattern Lock Using Acoustic Signals. In
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS ’18, pages 1775–1787, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, October 2018. ACM.
15
APPENDICES
A Survey Material
A.1 Main Study
1. Device Usage Questions
When referring to “mobile devices” throughout this survey,
consider these to include smartphones and tablet computers,
such as iPhone and Android phones and tablets. Traditional
laptop computers, two-in-one computers, like the Microsoft
Surface, or e-readers, like the Amazon Kindle, are not consid-
ered mobile devices for the purposes of this survey.
1. How many mobile devices do you use regularly? (In-
cluding phones and tablets, but excluding laptops)
◦ 0 ◦ 1 ◦ 2 ◦ 3 ◦ 4+ ◦ Prefer not to say
2. What brand of smartphone do you use? (Select all that
apply)
 Apple  Samsung  LG  Google (Pixel/Nexus)
 Motorola  ZTE  I do not own a smartphone
 Other:
3. Select “No” as the answer to this questions:
◦ Yes ◦ No ◦ Sometimes ◦ Always
4. Which method(s) do you use to lock your mobile de-
vice(s)?(Select all that apply)
 4-digit PIN  6-digit PIN  PIN of other length
 Android Graphical Pattern  LG Knock Codes
 Fingerprint  Face None Other:
The text and the graphics on the following pages changed
depending on the assigned grid size.
2. What are Knock Codes?
Knock Codes are an authentication method used to unlock
your smartphone, much like a PIN. To unlock the phone, the
user enters their knock Code by tapping different regions (or
quadrants) of [2x2|2x3] grid on the smartphone display. The
grid may or may not be displayed at the time of entry, for
example, below is a video of someone entering a Knock Code
without a grid displayed.
As part of this survey, you will be asked to select your own
Knock Codes using an on-screen approximation of a smart-
phone. You will enter your codes by clicking on different
regions of a [2x2|2x3] grid with your mouse. Below is an
image of the [2x2|2x3] grid and smartphone approximation.
con-2x2 & bla-2x2 big-2x3
There are some rules! When selecting a Knock Code it must:
1. Use at least 3 regions of the grid.
2. Use at least 6 total knocks.
On the next page, you will have a chance to practice entering
Knock Codes. After which, you will proceed with the rest of
the survey.
Participants performed a practice run of using the interface.
After completion, they were given the option to continue.
3. Practice
con-2x2 & bla-2x2 big-2x3
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4. Scenarios
For the remainder of this survey, you will be asked to create
Knock Codes for different scenarios.
Importantly, you will need to recall these codes later. So
choose something that is secure and memorable. However,
we ask that you DO NOT write down your codes or use other
aids to help you remember.
I understand that I should not write down my codes or
use other aids to assist in the survey:
◦ I understand
You will be asked to create Knock-Knock Codes for the
following scenarios.
All participants were assigned to Device Unlock, and then
one of either Banking App or Shopping Cart.
- Device Unlock Create a Knock Code you would use to
unlock your smartphone or tablet.
- Banking App Create a Knock Code you would use to
secure access to your mobile banking application.
- Shopping Cart Create a Knock Code you would use to
protect your Amazon shopping cart.
I understand that I should not write down my codes or
use other aids to assist in the survey:
◦ I understand
Steps 5, 6, and 7 were done twice. First for the Device Unlock,
then for the banking or shopping scenario.
5. Selection
Select a Knock Code for [SCENARIO]
6. Confirmation
Confirm the Knock Code for [SCENARIO]
7. Thinking about the Knock Code you just chose, an-
swer the following questions.
1. I feel this Knock Code provides adequate security for
this scenario.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
2. It was difficult to choose this Knock Code.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
3. What strategy did you use to make your code more se-
cure?
Answer:
4. What strategy did you use to make your code more mem-
orable?
Answer:
8. Please answer the following questions/prompts.
Select your agreement/disagreement with the following state-
ments
1. Knock Codes are a secure authenticator.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
2. Knock Codes are more secure than PIN codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Do not know what a PIN code is
3. Knock Codes are more secure than alphanumeric pass-
words.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Do not know what an alphanumeric passwords is
4. Knock Codes are more secure than Android patterns.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Do not know what an Android pattern is
Provide general feedback on the following questions
5. What are some aspects you like about Knock Codes?
(use N/A if you do not wish to answer)
Answer:
6. What are some aspects you do not like about Knock
Codes? (use N/A if you do not wish to answer)
Answer:
9. Please answer the following questions/prompts.
Select your agreement/disagreement with the following state-
ments
1. I think that I would like to use Knock Codes frequently.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
2. I found Knock Codes unnecessarily complex.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
3. I thought Knock Codes were easy to use.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person
to be able to use Knock Codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
5. I found the various functions in Knock Codes were well
integrated.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
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6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in Knock
Codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use
Knock Codes very quickly.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
8. Select Agree as the answer to this question.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
9. I found Knock Codes very cumbersome to use.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
10. I felt very confident using Knock Codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
11. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going
with Knock Codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
10. Recall
Recall your Knock Code for [SCENARIO]
11. Demographic Questions
1. What is your age range:
◦ 18-24 ◦ 25-29 ◦ 30-34 ◦ 35-39 ◦ 40-44 ◦ 45-49
◦ 50-54 ◦ 55-59 ◦ 60-64 ◦ 65+ ◦ Prefer not to say
2. With what gender do you identify:
◦Male ◦ Female ◦ Non-Binary/Third Gender
◦ Not described here ◦ Prefer not to say
3. What is your dominant hand?
◦ Left handed ◦ Right handed ◦ Ambidextrous
◦ Prefer not to say
4. Where you live is best described as:
◦ Urban ◦ Suburban ◦ Rural ◦ Prefer not to say
5. What is the highest degree or level of school you have
completed?
◦ Some high school ◦ High school ◦ Some college
◦ Trade, technical, or vocational training ◦ Associate’s
Degree ◦ Bachelor’s Degree ◦Master’s Degree
◦ Professional Degree ◦ Doctorate ◦ Prefer not to say
6. Which of the following best describes your educational
background or job field?
◦ I have an education in, or work in, the field of computer
science, computer engineering or IT.
◦ I do not have an education in, nor do I work in, the
field of computer science, computer engineering or IT.
◦ Prefer not to say
Please indicate if you’ve honestly participated in this survey
and followed instructions completely. You will not be penal-
ized/rejected for indicating “No” but your data may not be
included in the analysis:
◦ Yes ◦ No
A.2 Preliminary Study
1. Demographic Questions
1. What is your age range:
◦ 18-24 ◦ 25-29 ◦ 30-34 ◦ 35-39 ◦ 40-44 ◦ 45-49
◦ 50-54 ◦ 55-59 ◦ 60-64 ◦ 65+ ◦ Prefer not to say
2. With what gender do you identify:
◦Male ◦ Female ◦ Non-Binary/Third Gender
◦ Not described here ◦ Prefer not to say
3. What is your dominant hand?
◦ Left handed ◦ Right handed ◦ Ambidextrous
◦ Prefer not to say
4. Where you live is best described as:
◦ Urban ◦ Suburban ◦ Rural ◦ Prefer not to say
5. What is the highest degree or level of school you have
completed?
◦ Some high school ◦ High school ◦ Some college
◦ Trade, technical, or vocational training ◦ Associate’s
Degree ◦ Bachelor’s Degree ◦Master’s Degree
◦ Professional Degree ◦ Doctorate ◦ Prefer not to say
6. Which of the following best describes your educational
background or job field?
◦ I have an education in, or work in, the field of computer
science, computer engineering or IT.
◦ I do not have an education in, nor do I work in, the
field of computer science, computer engineering or IT.
◦ Prefer not to say
2. Device Usage Questions
When referring to “mobile devices” throughout this survey,
consider these to include smartphones and tablet computers,
such as iPhone and Android phones and tablets. Traditional
laptop computers, two-in-one computers, like the Microsoft
Surface, or e-readers, like the Amazon Kindle, are not consid-
ered mobile devices for the purposes of this survey.
1. How many mobile devices do you use regularly? (In-
cluding phones and tablets, but excluding laptops)
◦ 0 ◦ 1 ◦ 2 ◦ 3 ◦ 4+
18
2. What brand of smartphone do you use? (Select all that
apply)
 Apple  Samsung  LG  Google (Pixel/Nexus)
 Motorola  ZTE  Other:
3. Select “No” as the answer to this questions:
◦ Yes ◦ No ◦ Sometimes ◦ Always
4. Which method(s) do you use to lock your mobile de-
vice(s)?(Select all that apply)
 4-digit PIN  6-digit PIN  PIN of other length
 Android Graphical Pattern  LG Knock Codes
 Fingerprint  Face  Other:
3. What are Knock Codes?
Knock Codes are an authentication method used to unlock
your smartphone, much like a PIN. To unlock the phone, the
user enters their knock Code by tapping different regions (or
quadrants) of 2x2 grid on the smartphone display. The grid
may or may not be displayed at the time of entry, for example,
below is a video of someone entering a Knock Code without
a grid displayed.
As part of this survey, you will be asked to select your own
Knock Codes using an on-screen approximation of a smart-
phone. You will enter your codes by clicking on different
regions of a 2x2 grid with your mouse. Below is an image of
the 2x2 grid and smartphone approximation.
There are some rules! When selecting a Knock Code it must:
1. Use at least 3 regions of the grid.
2. Use at least 6 total knocks.
On the next page, you will have a chance to practice entering
Knock Codes. After which, you will proceed with the rest of
the survey.
4. Practice
Participants performed a practice run of using the interface.
After completion, they were given the option to continue.
5. Scenarios
For the remainder of this survey, you will be asked to create
Knock Codes for different scenarios.
Importantly, you will need to recall these codes later. So
choose something that is secure and memorable. However,
we ask that you DO NOT write down your codes or use other
aids to help you remember.
I understand that I should not write down my codes or
use other aids to assist in the survey:
◦ I understand
You will be asked to create Knock-Knock Codes for the
following scenarios.
All participants created Device Unlock, and then one of either
Banking App or Shopping Cart. The order was randomized.
- Device Unlock Create a Knock Code you would use to
unlock your smartphone or tablet.
- Banking App Create a Knock Code you would use to
secure access to your mobile banking application.
- Shopping Cart Create a Knock Code you would use to
protect your Amazon shopping cart.
I understand that I should not write down my codes or
use other aids to assist in the survey:
◦ I understand
Steps 5, 6, and 7 were done twice. For the Device Unlock
and for the banking or shopping scenario. The order was
randomized.
6. Selection
Select a Knock Code for [SCENARIO]
7. Confirmation
Confirm the Knock Code for [SCENARIO]
19
8. Thinking about the Knock Code you just chose, an-
swer the following questions.
1. I feel this Knock Code provides adequate security for
this scenario.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
2. It was difficult to choose this Knock Code.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
3. What strategy did you use to make your code more se-
cure?
Answer:
4. What strategy did you use to make your code more mem-
orable?
Answer:
9. Please answer the following questions/prompts.
Select your agreement/disagreement with the following state-
ments
1. Knock Codes are a secure authenticator.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
2. Knock Codes are more secure than PIN codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Do not know what a PIN code is
3. Knock Codes are more secure than alphanumeric pass-
words.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Do not know what an alphanumeric passwords is
4. Knock Codes are more secure than Android patterns.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
◦ Do not know what an Android pattern is
Provide general feedback on the following questions
5. What are some aspects you like about Knock Codes?
(use N/A if you do not wish to answer)
Answer:
6. What are some aspects you do not like about Knock
Codes? (use N/A if you do not wish to answer)
Answer:
10. Please answer the following questions/prompts.
Select your agreement/disagreement with the following state-
ments
1. I would like to use Knock Codes frequently.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
2. Knock Codes are unnecessarily complex.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
3. Knock Codes are easy to use.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
4. I would need the support of a technical person to be able
to use Knock Codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
5. I would make a lot of mistakes if I were to use Knock
Codes.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
6. Most people would learn to use Knock Codes very
quickly.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
7. Select Agree as the answer to this question.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
8. I found Knock Codes very cumbersome to use.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
9. I would neet to practice Knock Codes more before I
could use them.
◦ Strongly Agree ◦ Agree ◦ Neither agree nor disagree
◦ Disagree ◦ Strongly disagree
11. Recall
Recall your Knock Code for [SCENARIO]
Please indicate if you’ve honestly participated in this survey
and followed instructions completely. You will not be penal-
ized/rejected for indicating “No” but your data may not be
included in the analysis:
◦ Yes ◦ No
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B Additional Figures & Tables
74.3% 11.9%
8.7% 5.0%
(a) Device Unlock
66.3% 14.4%
9.6% 9.6%
(b) Shopping Cart
69.3% 15.8%
7.0% 7.9%
(c) Banking
Application
71.1% 13.5%
8.5% 6.9%
(d) Overall
Figure 8: Frequency of start quadrants per scenario in the pre-
liminary study.
12.4% 32.6%
23.9% 31.2%
(a) Device Unlock
16.3% 28.8%
25.0% 29.8%
(b) Shopping Cart
18.4% 32.5%
23.7% 25.4%
(c) Banking
Application
14.9% 31.7%
24.1% 29.4%
(d) Overall
Figure 9: Frequency of end quadrants per scenario in the pre-
liminary study.
69.0% 12.9%
12.1% 6.0%
(a) Device Unlock
60.0% 20.0%
10.0% 10.0%
(b) Shopping Cart
62.5% 17.9%
14.3% 5.4%
(c) Banking
Application
65.1% 15.9%
12.1% 6.9%
(d) Overall
Figure 10: Frequency of start quadrants per scenario for the
control treatment.
16.4% 27.6%
31.0% 25.0%
(a) Device Unlock
18.3% 30.0%
23.3% 28.3%
(b) Shopping Cart
21.4% 16.1%
32.1% 30.4%
(c) Banking
Application
18.1% 25.4%
29.3% 27.2%
(d) Overall
Figure 11: Frequency of end quadrants per scenario for the
control treatment.
62.1% 16.4%
12.1% 9.5%
(a) Device Unlock
45.8% 13.6%
18.6% 22.0%
(b) Shopping Cart
52.6% 21.1%
10.5% 15.8%
(c) Banking
Application
55.6% 16.8%
13.4% 14.2%
(d) Overall
Figure 12: Frequency of start quadrants per scenario for the
blacklist treatment.
18.1% 24.1%
28.4% 29.3%
(a) Device Unlock
16.9% 30.5%
30.5% 22.0%
(b) Shopping Cart
28.1% 26.3%
26.3% 19.3%
(c) Banking
Application
20.3% 26.3%
28.4% 25.0%
(d) Overall
Figure 13: Frequency of end quadrants per scenario for the
blacklist treatment.
76.5% 9.2%
0.0% 0.0%
8.4% 5.9%
(a) Device Unlock
57.1% 17.9%
8.9% 3.6%
5.4% 7.1%
(b) Shopping Cart
54.0% 19.0%
6.3% 0.0%
9.5% 11.1%
(c) Banking
Application
66.0% 13.9%
3.8% 0.8%
8.0% 7.6%
(d) Overall
Figure 14: Frequency of start quadrants per scenario for the big
treatment.
10.1% 15.1%
11.8% 17.6%
22.7% 22.7%
(a) Device Unlock
19.6% 21.4%
8.9% 10.7%
16.1% 23.2%
(b) Shopping Cart
14.3% 19.0%
9.5% 17.5%
19.0% 20.6%
(c) Banking
Application
13.4% 17.6%
10.5% 16.0%
20.2% 22.3%
(d) Overall
Figure 15: Frequency of end quadrants per scenario for the big
treatment.
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Table 8: Comparison of the guessing metrics for a perfect-knowledge attacker between the scenarios.
Online Guessing (Success %) Offline Guessing (bits)
Dataset λ3 λ10 λ30 H∞ G˜0.1 G˜0.2 G˜0.5
C
on
tr
ol Device Unlock∗ 17.9 % 37.5 % 73.2 % 3.81 3.81 4.10 4.93
Banking App. 10.7 % 30.4 % 66.1 % 4.81 4.81 4.81 5.31
Shopping Cart∗ 21.4 % 42.9 % 78.6 % 2.81 2.81 3.75 4.63
B
la
ck
lis
t Device Unlock∗ 10.7 % 25.0 % 60.7 % 4.81 4.81 5.19 5.53
Banking App.∗ 8.9 % 21.4 % 57.1 % 4.22 5.20 5.52 5.67
Shopping Cart∗ 12.5 % 26.8 % 62.5 % 4.22 4.58 4.99 5.45
L
ar
ge
Device Unlock∗ 17.9 % 41.1 % 76.8 % 3.81 3.99 4.20 4.79
Banking App.∗ 12.5 % 32.1 % 67.9 % 4.22 4.58 4.68 5.21
Shopping Cart 16.1 % 38.0 % 73.2 % 3.81 3.99 4.40 4.96
1s
t-
E
nt
ry Device Unlock∗ 16.1 % 33.9 % 69.6 % 3.81 3.99 4.40 5.12
Banking App.∗ 12.5 % 28.6 % 64.3 % 4.22 4.58 4.81 5.38
Shopping Cart.∗ 16.1 % 33.9 % 69.6 % 3.81 3.99 4.40 5.12
∗: For a fair comparison we downsampled all marked datasets to the size of the smallest datasets (56 Knock Codes).
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Group Question
I think I would like to use Knock Codes frequently.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I found Knock Codes unnecessarily complex.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I thought Knock Codes were easy to use.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I think I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use Knock Codes.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I found the various functions in Knock Codes were well integrated.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I thought there was too much inconsistency in Knock Codes.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I would imagine that most people would learn to use Knock Codes very quickly.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I found Knock Codes very cumbersome to use.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I felt very confident using Knock Codes.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3 0 20 40 60 80 100
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with Knock Codes.
con-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
bla-2x2 0 20 40 60 80 100
big-2x3
0 20 40 60 80 100
Strg. Agr. Agr. Neut. Disagr. Strg. Disagr.
Figure 16: Responses to SUS questions: Averages are con-2x2 (69.8), bla-2x2 (65.3), and big-2x3 (68.1)
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Table 9: Qualitative codebook from post selection usable and security response.
Question Code Freq. Description Participant Sample
Post−4 PATTERN 104 Visualized a sequence or pattern "Not overly random but three blocks of two patterns"
SIMPLE 100 Used simple methods "I used something that wasn’t to [sic] complicated"
EASY TO REMEMBER 77 Focused on overall memorability "Something easy for me to remember but hard for someone else"
DIRECTIONAL 76 Went in a specific sequence or order "I used a specific direction as my way to remember like opening a box
or lifting a lid."
REPEATED 55 Tapped same quads multiple times "I started at the top left quadrant and went clockwise."
PERSONAL 52 Associated code with something personal "I assigned numbers to the quadrants and input a date I’d remember."
NONE 51 Had no strategy "Didn’t use one."
VARIATION 40 Altered previous codes "I used a combination that was similar to my other code but with a
Twist."
SHAPE 38 Followed a specific shape "I patterned it off of a shape I would remember. In this case it was an
underlined x."
GAME 18 Used or made a game out of the sequence "I tried to imagine a song pattern like Simon says."
Post−3 RANDOM 78 Randomized use of quadrants and taps "I tried to use random blocks to make it harder to guess."
EASY TO REMEMBER 70 Prioritized memorability over security "I was more concerned with it being easy to remember than security."
LONG 56 Made codes longer as a means of security "I tried to lengthen it to make it harder to crack."
ALL QUADRANTS 52 Used all quadrants in the provided grid "Using all the squares on all of the regions"
UNEXPECTED 44 Avoided predictable patterns "I tried to make it slightly more unpredictable than I normally would."
NONE 42 Did not use any strategy for security "Since this is not for my device I did not try to make it that secure. If it
were my device I would write it down and it would be extensive."
MULTIPLE REGIONS 40 Used a variety of quadrants, not necessarily all
regions
"I tried to use multiple squares more than once to make it more secure."
HARD TO GUESS 38 Chose a code that was deemed difficult to
guess
"Something I didn’t think anyone could guess."
DIFFERENT 37 Using a different code or modification than the
first code
"I needed it to be drastically different then [sic] the first code."
Security−6 HARD TO REMEMBER 124 Found it difficult to recall codes "It’s seems hard to remember the different patterns"
INSECURE 90 Found it to be a less complex means of authen-
tication
"Same thing as a pin without the numbers and with less combination
possibilities."
HARD TO TYPE 19 Found it difficult to input "I could easily forget or tap the wrong location especially if there is
no grid. Also it doesnt seem as fast as using a pattern to unlock like I
currently do.."
NONE 16 Had no issues "Can’t think of anything I overly dislike."
NOT AN IMPROVEMENT 7 Considered it not better than other existing au-
thentication methods
"There is absolutely no reason to use them for me or most people. They
are hard to remember and not any different from a pin code."
Security−5 EASY 75 Found usability to be simple and straightfor-
ward
"Simple to input doesn’t need much screen confirmation."
HARD TO GUESS 42 Considered it a complex method of authenti-
cation
"I like how you can switch the codes up to many different patterns. It
really makes it harder for people to guess what it is."
DISCREET 40 Liked that it was/can be hidden and discrete "You can be surreptitious and lock or unlock things without seeming
like you are."
QUICK 39 Found it to be efficient and quick "It seems very convenient it can be quick and it gets old typing in my
pin so much."
FUN 32 Found it fun to use "I like that they are unique and I like entering them it is enjoyable."
Post−4: What strategy did you use to make your code more memorable?
Post−3: What strategy did you use to make your code more secure?
Security−5: What are some aspects you like about Knock-Knock Codes?
Security−6: What are some aspects you do not like about Knock-Knock Codes?
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